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Must the Fed Fight Growth?
by Jerry L. Jordan
If all of your information about the
economy came from the nightly news
and the daily press, your thinking would
probably go something like this:
"A funny thing happened on the way to
this economic boom. The economy gave
a party and the Federal Reserve didn't
come. Just as U.S. business activity was
poised to burst from under the lingering
shadows of the 1990-91 recession, mone-
tary policy took a decidedly restrictive
turn this year. Apparently, central bankers
have been willing to sacrifice economic
expansion in order to tilt at inflation
windmills existing only in their own hy-
peractive imaginations."
For evidence that this interpretation of
policy is widespread, one need look no
further than a recent headline reporting
the Federal Open Market Committee's
(FOMC) latest move: "Federal Reserve
Raises Key Rates to Curb Growth." So
said the New York Times. So says Con-
ventional Wisdom.
But is Conventional Wisdom in fact
wise? I think not. This Economic Com-
mentaiy examines what I believe are
three fundamental misconceptions
about current monetary policy:
• Interest rates paid by households
and businesses would have remained
low if monetary policy had remained
stimulative.
• Rising federal funds rates — or,
more specifically, overnight interbank
loan rates — will shorten or retard the
current expansion.
• The monetary authorities control in-
flation by regulating the real growth of
the economy.
These beliefs have arisen as false corol-
laries to two general observations about
modern industrial economies, namely, 1)
the level of interest rates affects private
spending, and 2) periods in which spend-
ing on current output accelerates are fol-
lowed by periods of higher inflation.
These familiar assertions are a standard
part of macroeconomic analysis. As such,
I would not enjoy the task of undermin-
ing their acceptance and make no attempt
to do so here. What I do want to accom-
plish is to confront the current mythology
surrounding monetary policy actions by
combining these propositions with two
others: 1) inflation results from too much
money chasing too few goods, and 2) the
Federal Reserve is charged with achiev-
ing multiple — and often conflicting —
economic objectives, as opposed to being
held accountable for price stability alone.
I want to emphasize this last point.
Not only does the U.S. central bank
lack a clear statutory responsibility for
price stability, but the very meaning of
that term is subject to a great deal of
ambiguity. The absence of a fully cred-
ible commitment to the stable purchas-
ing power of the dollar has led to over-
interpretation of every twitch, sneeze,
and cough by monetary policymakers.
In a recent speech, Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland President Jerry L.
Jordan responded to critics who as-
sert that the Federal Reserve inten-
tionally slows the real growth of the
economy in order to keep wage and
price pressures in check. In Jordan's
view, the critics have it backwards:
Monetary policy actions aimed at sta-
bilizing the purchasing power of
money are the best way to enhance
real growth in the long run.• Why Do Interest Rates Rise?
By way of analogy, let me start with a
different question. Why does the price
of apples rise? The answer, of course,
is simple. The price of apples rises
along with the cost of everything else
when the purchasing power of money
falls — the phenomenon referred to as
inflation — or when there is a funda-
mental change in demand or supply. If
demand increases or supply falls,
prices rise.
This simple example is directly rele-
vant because an interest rate, after all,
is really just a price. In particular, it is
the price paid to savers and by borrow-
ers. Like apple prices, then, interest
rates pick up either because the rate of
inflation increases (more precisely, be-
cause the expected rate of inflation in-
creases), or because there is an excess
demand for the funds that are provided
by national saving.
For instance, an orchard blight would
boost the price of apples while reduc-
ing the quantity demanded. In this case,
we would be inclined to believe that the
price increase is unwelcome news for
apple lovers. However, suppose a cred-
ible scientific report indicates that ap-
ples can prevent a variety of diseases.
Prices then rise because of a boom in
apple demand — and a corresponding
drop in the demand for something else,
such as oranges — and everyone is per-
fectly willing to see the hikes for what
they are: the natural consequence of
market forces responding to buyers' in-
creased desire to consume apples.
The failure to think carefully about
what is happening to the demand for
credit leads some people to ignore the
possibility that rising interest rates are
merely a by-product of better times. In
periods of expanding output, economic
prospects brighten, and households and
firms respond with a heightened desire
to consume as well as invest. In finan-
cial markets, these desires translate
into a reduced incentive to save and a
greater incentive to borrow. The result
is higher interest rates.
Economic developments over the past
several years have been highly unusual.
The first two years of the recovery that
commenced in April 1991 were anemic
by postwar standards. Dramatic cuts in
defense spending, problems in the com-
mercial real estate sector, and a striking
weakness in job markets have been a
hallmark of this business recovery. Be-
cause of these extraordinary factors, ex-
pectations of better times were slow to
materialize. As a result, demand pres-
sures in the aggregate economy did not
emerge, and both short- and long-term
interest rates continued to fall until last
October — two and a half years into
the expansion.
As of last autumn, market expectations
of nominal growth had been converg-
ing to 6 percent, and the subsequent
drop in long-term bond yields reflected
that consensus forecast. Sometime dur-
ing the second half of 1993, the tide be-
gan to turn, and the economy entered a
period more like the first year of a typi-
cal recovery than the third. After lan-
guishing for more than two years, the
long-anticipated pickup in employment
finally materialized in the first six
months of 1994, and most forecasters
now expect the rate of output growth
for the current year to reach its highest
level since 1988. As sentiment has
shifted in the direction of somewhat
faster real growth — and somewhat
greater price increases — expectations
about total spending in the economy
have risen.
In such an environment, higher market in-
terest rates were inevitable. Apart from
engineering steps to reduce the public's
expectations of inflation, there was noth-
ing the monetary authorities could have
done. And, with the exception of adopt-
ing such a policy stance, there was noth-
ing they should have done.
• Tacking toward Neutrality
Rising market rates are indeed impor-
tant for understanding recent monetary
policy actions, but not for the reasons
that are generally believed. The central
bank does not control mortgage rates,
car loan rates, or corporate bond yields.
It controls the supply of money. Unfor-
tunately, though, the monetary authori-
ties have considerable difficulty in esti-
mating — and certainly do not control
— the amount of money balances peo-
ple want to hold. This is critical be-
cause, in the words of Milton Fried-
man, inflation is everywhere and is
always a monetary phenomenon.
This crucial point is often muddled be-
cause the central bank employs inter-
bank lending rates to control the quan-
tity of money. If the job is done
correctly, money growth will equal
money demand, so the price level will
be stable. This requires that as general
economic conditions change, the inter-
bank interest rate consistent with this
result will also change.
Sailing provides a good analogy. The
helmsman of a boat leaving New Eng-
land bound for the Bahamas must set
the tiller based on wind direction, tides,
and currents. Those of you familiar with
sailing the Atlantic know that it won't
be long before the sailor is confronted
with different wind and water condi-
tions than those that prevailed near the
coast. Experience, of course, will lead
him to adjust the tiller in response to
evolving conditions. This certainly
does not imply a change in destination.
Quite the opposite. The adjustment is
required if the boat is to have any hope
of reaching the Bahamas as planned.
This is how I would like the public to
think of recent monetary policy moves.
In response to the changing economic
weather, it is imperative that the central
bank adjust the monetary tiller, lest we
drift further and further away from the
goal of price stability.
• Are Recent Policy
Moves Pro-Growth?
The rationale for focusing on the pur-
chasing power of money is rooted in
the overriding goal of maximizing so-
cial welfare. By any rational calcula-
tion, this requires that policy be devoted
to promoting conditions that yield the
highest rate of sustainable economic
growth in the long run. Sound money
is crucial to sustained prosperity.Any drift in the price level, even if fully
expected, induces expenditures aimed
at insulating the fruits of labor and in-
vestment from inflation-created in-
creases in tax burdens. Even so-called
stable and moderate inflation requires
excessive churning of financial assets,
as ever more sophisticated cash man-
agement strategies are needed to avoid
the ongoing erosion of the purchasing
power of money. All of these activities
absorb resources, which boosts the cost
of production and ultimately hampers
the economy's long-run growth.
Furthermore, when the price level is un-
certain, market participants face the
prospects of capricious and unanticipated
redistributions of wealth. As a result,
doubts about the dollar's future purchas-
ing power channel resources away from
the direct production of consumption
and investment goods and toward ac-
tivities that serve only to protect deci-
sionmakers from the negative-sum re-
allocative consequences of inflation.
Achieving price stability would be like
a positive technological advance. It
would release resources from inflation
hedging/risk avoidance activities and
boost the amount of real goods and
services that can be produced with the
economy's existing resources. In this
way, moving toward price stability is
pro-growth.
• Does Price Stability Require
the Fed to Fight Growth?
Bond market participants, the financial
press, and so-called "Fedwatchers" con-
sistently react to economic indicators
that point toward stronger real growth
by citing the possible inflationary con-
sequences of an economy that is ex-
panding too quickly. I believe that this
view is largely a reflection of the ab-
sence of a credible commitment to price
stability. Announcement of clear and
verifiable multiyear targets for the price
level would be one way to build credi-
bility. With such a commitment, short-
run deviations from these targets could
be accommodated without eroding the
public's confidence in the purchasing
power of the dollar. At the least, the
lack of such a credible commitment
traps public discourse into the unpro-
ductive and perverse rhetoric of treat-
ing growth as undermining price stabil-
ity. At the worst, we are all duped into
accepting the rhetoric as reality, ulti-
mately leading to policies that are de-
structive of both economic growth and
a stable and predictable monetary
standard.
• Communication Breakdown
Many economists, and the news media
in general, think that central bankers
are more interested in inflation control
than in economic growth (as if there is
a trade-off) and that we must deliber-
ately slow the economy in order to
achieve an inflation objective.
The economic view leading to these
conclusions is a combination of a
"slack model" and a perceived need to
fine-tune aggregate demand. The Fed-
eral Reserve is regarded as responsible
for continuously manipulating the level
of total spending in the economy to
equal some estimated level of potential
output. (Parenthetically, this line of
thinking also exposes the monetary
authorities to all of the political prob-
lems that arise when actual levels of
output and employment are not "high
enough" to suit the needs of the elec-
toral cycle.)
If households and businesses through-
out the nation — as well as our elected
political leaders — knew and agreed
that all central bank actions were, and
should be, focused on achieving the
highest sustainable rate of real eco-
nomic growth, the timing of particular
actions would not generate much news.
If it were generally believed that mone-
tary policy would be steered to achiev-
ing this end by a single-minded pursuit
of sound money, then specific short-
run adjustments would have no more
meaning than the helmsman's adjust-
ment of the tiller when the wind shifts.
From now on, when you see a story that
says "Fed Raises Interest Rates to Slow
Housing Starts" (or auto sales or eco-
nomic growth), I hope you will think
about matters differently. The short-
term interest rate policies of the FOMC
cannot be simply characterized by ref-
erences to "tightening" when interbank
rates rise or "easing" when they fall. A
3 percent federal funds rate with infla-
tion expectations of 3 percent, and ris-
ing real interest rates, would be quite
expansive and inconsistent with the
pursuit of price stability. However, that
same funds rate may be perfectly ap-
propriate when inflation expectations
are falling toward 1 percent or so.
Progress in the conduct of monetary
policy would be greatly enhanced by a
vigorous effort to eliminate the notion
that adjustments in monetary policy are
intended to manipulate real economic
activity in order to control inflation. In
reality, it's the other way around. Mone-
tary policy actions geared to promoting
price stability will enhance real growth
over time.
Just as a boat cannot sail toward two des-
tinations simultaneously, the tools of
monetary policy are not capable of
achieving multiple goals — at least not in
the short run. An explicit commitment to
a multiyear price level objective would
increase the short-term flexibility of pol-
icy and also promote higher standards of
living in the future by steering us toward
the one destination that the central bank
— and the central bank only — can
reach: a stable currency.
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